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742 Part VI: Measuring and Trading Volatility
implied volatility was a poor predictor of actual volatility for most of the time on these
graphs. Moreover, implied volatility remained low at the right-hand side of the charts
(January 2000) even though the stock doubled in the course of a month.
The important thing to note from these figures is that they clearly show that
implied volatility is really not a very good predictor of the actual volatility that is to
follow. If it were, the difference line would hover near zero most of the time. Instead,
it swings back and forth wildly, with implied volatility over- or underestimating actu­
al volatility by quite wide levels. Thus, the current estimates of volatility by traders
(i.e., implied volatility) can actually be quite wrong.
Conversely, one could also say that historical volatility is not a great predictor of
volatility that is to follow, either, especially in the short term. No one really makes any
claims that it is a good predictor, for historical volatility is merely a reflection of what
has happened in the past. All we can say for sure is that implied and historical volatil­
ity tend to trade within a range.
One thing that does stand out on these charts is that implied volatility seems to
fluctuate less than actual volatility. That seems to be a natural function of the volatil­
ity predictive process. For example, when the market collapses, implied volatilities of
options rise only modestly. This can be observed by again referring to Figure 36-4,
the $0EX option example. The only shaded area on the graph occurred when the
market had a rather sharp sell-off during October 1999. In previous years, when
there had been even more severe market declines (October 1997 or August-October
1998) $0EX actual volatility had briefly moved above implied volatility (this data for
1997 and 1998 is shown in Figure 36-9). In other words, option traders and market­
makers are predicting volatility when they price options, and one tends to make a
FIGURE 36-9.
$OEX implied versus historical volatility, 1997-1998.
Actual
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10
0
D J F M A
-20 1997 1998