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Risk and the Intelligent Option Investor 265
For an intelligent option investor who has a long-term worst-case
valuation that is now 20 percent higher than the market price, there is a
wonderful opportunity to sell a put and receive a fat premium (with the
possibility of owning the stock at an attractive discount to the likely fair
value), sell a put and use the proceeds to buy an OTM call LEAPS, or sim-
ply buy the stock to open a position.
Indeed, this strategy is perfectly in keeping with the dictum, “Be fear-
ful when others are greedy and greedy when others are fearful. ” This strat-
egy is also perfectly reasonable but obviously rests on the ability of the
investor to accurately estimate the actual intrinsic value of a stock. This
brings us to the next form of risk—valuation risk.
Valuation Risk
Although valuation is not a difficult process, it is one that necessarily in-
cludes unknowable elements. In our own best- and worst-case valuation
methodology, we have allowed for these unknowns by focusing on plausi-
ble ranges rather than precise point estimates. Of course, our best- or worst-
case estimates might be wrong. This could be due to our misunderstanding
of the economic dynamics of the business in which we have invested or
may even come about because of the way we originally framed the problem.
Thinking back to how we defined our ranges, recall that we were focusing
on one-standard-deviation probabilities—in other words, scenarios that
might plausibly be expected to materialize two times out of three. Obvi-
ously, even if we understand the dynamics of the business very well, one
time out of three, our valuation process will generate a fair value range that
is, in fact, materially different from the actual intrinsic value of the stock.
In contrast to market risk, which most often is a nonmaterial and tem-
porary issue, misestimating the fair value of a stock represents a material
risk to capital, whether our valuation range is too low or too high. If we esti-
mate a valuation range that is too low, we are likely to end up not allocating
enough capital to the investment or using inappropriately light leverage.
This means that we will have missed the opportunity to generate as much
return on this investment as we may have. If we estimate a valuation range
that is too high, we are likely to end up allocating too much capital to the