Add training workflow, datasets, and runbook

training_data/curated/text/f8eb15000fb57eada58703afc2ae2d2a5172899e71cd8d736c84f83efb99a049.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+272  •   The Intelligent Option Investor
+It is important to realize that the fact that options are usually 
+efficiently priced in the short term does not prevent us from transacting 
+in short-tenor options. In fact, some strategies discussed in Part III are 
+actually more attractive when an investor uses shorter-tenor options or 
+combines short- and long-tenor options into a single strategy.
+Hopefully, the distinction between avoiding short-tenor option 
+strategies and making long-term investments in short-tenor options is 
+clear after reading through Part III.
+Fungible Underlying Assets
+Again, returning for a moment to the foundation of the BSM, the scholars built 
+their mathematical models by studying short-term agricultural commodity 
+markets. A commodity is, by definition, a fungible or interchangeable asset; 
+one bushel of corn of a certain quality rating is completely indistinguishable 
+from any other bushel of corn of the same quality rating.
+Stocks, on the other hand, are idiosyncratic assets. They are intangible 
+markers of value for incredibly complex systems called companies, no two 
+of which is exactly alike (e.g., GM and Ford—the pair that illustrates the 
+idea of “paired” investments in many people’s minds—are both American 
+car companies, but as operating entities, they have some significant differ-
+ences. For example, GM has a much larger presence in China and has a 
+different capital and governance structure since going bankrupt than Ford, 
+which avoided bankruptcy during the mortgage crisis).
+The academics who built the BSM were not hesitant to apply a model 
+that would value idiosyncratic assets such as stocks because they had as-
+sumed from the start that financial markets are efficient—meaning that 
+every idiosyncratic feature for a given stock was already fully “priced in” 
+by the market. This allowed them to overlook the complexity of individual 
+companies and treat them as interchangeable, homogeneous entities.
+The BSM, then, did not value idiosyncratic, multidimensional 
+companies; rather, it valued single-dimensional entities that the scholars 
+assumed had already been “standardized” or commoditized in some sense 
+by the communal wisdom of the markets. Y ou will see in the next sec-
+tion that the broad, implicit assumption by option market participants 
+that markets are efficient actually brings about the greatest opportunity